Nom du corpus

Corpus Systématique Animale

Titre du document

Monitoring cooperative equilibria in a stochastic differential game

Lien vers le document
Éditeur
Springer (journals)
Langue(s) du document
Anglais
Type de document
Research-article
Mots-clés d'auteur
  • Stochastic differential games
  • memory strategies
  • equilibria
  • fishery modeling
  • dynamic programming
  • switching diffusion processes
  • numerical techniques
Nom du fichier dans la ressource
Poissons_v2b_003453
Auteur(s)
  • A. Haurie 1
  • J. B. Krawczyk 2
  • M. Roche 3
Affiliation(s)
  • 1) Department of Industrial Economics, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
  • 2) Faculty of Commerce and Administration, Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand
  • 3) Cray Research, Lausanne, Switzerland
Résumé

This paper deals with a class of equilibria which are based on the use of memory strategies in the context of continuous-time stochastic differential games. In order to get interpretable results, we will focus the study on a stochastic differential game model of the exploitation of one species of fish by two competing fisheries. We explore the possibility of defining a so-called cooperative equilibrium, which will implement a fishing agreement. In order to obtain that equilibrium, one defines a monitoring variable and an associated retaliation scheme. Depending on the value of the monitoring variable, which provides some evidence of a deviation from the agreement, the probability increases that the mode of a game will change from a cooperative to a punitive one. Both the monitoring variable and the parameters of this jump process are design elements of the cooperative equilibrium. A cooperative equilibrium designed in this way is a solution concept for a switching diffusion game. We solve that game using the sufficient conditions for a feedback equilibrium which are given by a set of coupled HJB equations. A numerical analysis, approximating the solution of the HJB equations through an associated Markov game, enables us to show that there exist cooperative equilibria which dominate the classical feedback Nash equilibrium of the original diffusion game model.

Catégories Science-Metrix
  • 1 - applied sciences
  • 2 - engineering
  • 3 - operations research
Catégories INIST
  • 1 - sciences appliquees, technologies et medecines
  • 2 - sciences exactes et technologie
  • 3 - terre, ocean, espace
  • 4 - geophysique externe
Catégories Scopus
  • 1 - Physical Sciences ; 2 - Mathematics ; 3 - Applied Mathematics
  • 1 - Social Sciences ; 2 - Decision Sciences ; 3 - Management Science and Operations Research
  • 1 - Physical Sciences ; 2 - Mathematics ; 3 - Control and Optimization
Catégories WoS
  • 1 - science ; 2 - operations research & management science
  • 1 - science ; 2 - mathematics, applied
Identifiant ISTEX
6989A22530FA463730F8F2078F89A853E8A99C1F
Revue

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications

Année de publication
1994
Présence de XML structuré
Non
Version PDF
1.3
Score qualité du texte
9.592
Sous-corpus
  • Poissons
Type de publication
Journal
ark:/67375/1BB-6CMFRS8K-S
Powered by Lodex 9.3.8